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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are well-known to
be vulnerable to Adversarial Examples (AEs). A large amount of
efforts have been spent to launch and heat the arms race between
the attackers and defenders. Recently, advanced gradient-based
attack techniques were proposed (e.g., BPDA and EOT), which
have defeated a considerable number of existing defense methods.
Up to today, there are still no satisfactory solutions that can
effectively and efficiently defend against those attacks.
In this paper, we make a steady step towards mitigating those
advanced gradient-based attacks with two major contributions.
First, we perform an in-depth analysis about the root causes of
those attacks, and propose four properties that can break the
fundamental assumptions of those attacks. Second, we identify a
set of operations that can meet those properties. By integrating
these operations, we design two preprocessing functions that can
invalidate these powerful attacks. Extensive evaluations indicate
that our solutions can effectively mitigate all existing standard
and advanced attack techniques, and beat 11 state-of-the-art
defense solutions published in top-tier conferences over the past
2 years. The defender can employ our solutions to constrain the
attack success rate below 7% for the strongest attacks even the
adversary has spent dozens of GPU hours.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the year of 2013, Szegedy et al. [1] proposed the concept
of Adversarial Examples (AEs) to attack Deep Learning (DL)
models: with imperceptible and human unnoticeable modifica-
tions to the input, the model will be fooled to give wrong pre-
diction results. This study has received widespread attention
from both machine learning and security communities. Such
popularity is due to two reasons. First, the existence of AEs
reveals the distinctions of understanding and interpretation
between humans and machines. Although DL models have
satisfactory performance in terms of automation, speed, and
possibly accuracy, they can make simple mistakes that humans
will never do. So understanding the mechanisms of AEs
can help improve the robustness of DL models. Second, as
DL techniques have been widely commercialized in various
products, AEs can threaten these DL applications and bring
catastrophic consequences to our daily life. The practicality
1equal contribution
Fig. 1: The number of research papers published on Arxiv.org about
adversarial examples. Data source: [16]
and severity of AEs have been proved by past works (au-
tonomous driving [2], [3], [4], home automation [5], [6], [7],
etc.). It is in urgent need of effective and efficient defense
solutions to thwart AEs.
Over the past seven years, a great number of research papers
have been published in this topic, and it is still growing
at an increasing speed (Fig. 1). A majority of these papers
focused on enhancing the powers of AEs or mitigating the
new attack techniques. This leads to an arms race between
attacks and defenses. Generally speaking, the generation of
AEs can be converted into an optimization problem: searching
for the minimal perturbations that can cause the model to
predict a different targeted or untargeted label. Then, com-
mon attack techniques adopt the gradient-based approaches
to identify the optimal perturbations (e.g., FGSM [8], I-
FGSM [9], LBFGS [1], DeepFool [10], and C&W [11]). To
defeat those attacks, a lot of defense solutions were proposed
to obfuscate the gradients and increase the difficulty of solving
the optimization [12], [13], [14], [15]. These solutions tried
to either prohibit the gradient calculation by introducing non-
differentiable operations (shattered gradients) or randomize the
gradient to hide the actual value (stochastic gradients).
Unfortunately, neither of the two directions can provide
strong protection and robustness, and advanced attacks were
proposed to break those gradient obfuscation based defenses
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[17], [18]. Specifically, to cope with shattered gradients,
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) was
introduced to approximate the gradient values by replacing
the non-differentiable function with its input on the backward
pass. To handle stochastic gradients, Expectation over Trans-
formation (EOT) was designed to calculate the gradient of
random functions as the average values of multiple sessions
statistically. These advanced techniques have successfully de-
feated the previous defensive solutions [17]. Even after their
disclosure, new defense methodologies published in the recent
two years are still proven to be vulnerable to either BPDA,
EOT, or their combination [19]. To the best of our knowledge,
there are still no satisfactory preprocessing-based approaches
to mitigate those two advanced techniques up to today. They
seem to have ended the arms race with the adversary’s victory.
The question we want to address in this paper is: is it
possible to continue the competition with more advanced
defense solutions to mitigate the above advanced attacks? This
is an extremely challenging task due to the omnipotence of
those attacks. On one hand, they assume very high adversarial
capabilities: the attacker knows every detail (mechanisms and
parameters) of the DL model as well as the potential defenses.
This assumption can significantly increase the difficulty for
defense designs, and existing solutions that require to hide
the model or defense mechanisms are not applicable. On the
other hand, BPDA and EOT techniques target the root causes
of gradient obfuscation: the introduced mitigation operations
need to be carefully designed and configured in order not
to affect the model accuracy. As such, the non-differentiable
operation can always be approximated as the input, and the
random operation can always be estimated by averaging over
randomization. Based on these two observations, the attacks
can effectively break existing gradient obfuscation techniques.
We propose defense solutions to overcome the above chal-
lenges and increase the difficulty and cost of these advanced
adversarial attacks. The key insight of our solutions is that
the assumption in BPDA (the preprocessing function g(·)
must satisfy the property g(x) ≈ x in order to guarantee
f(g(x)) = f(x), where f is the target model) is not necessary
and can be relaxed.
Our first contribution is to propose four properties for de-
signing a preprocessing function g(·) to mitigate those attacks:
(1) g(·) can maintain the model accuracy: f(g(x)) = f(x);
(2) it has relatively big divergence from x; (3) its gradient
is random and unpredictable; (4) it is non-differentiable. The
first three requirements can invalidate BPDA attacks, while the
last one can invalidate EOT. It can definitely mitigate other
standard adversarial attacks as well.
Our second contribution is to identify a set of operations
that meet these properties: Feature Distillation (FD) [20] is an
advanced compression-based method. Randomization Layer
(Rand) [14] preprocesses the image with random rescaling,
padding, and reshaping. We further design a new operation,
Random Distortion over Grids (RDG), which distorts the image
via random pixel dropping and displacement. We integrate
these operations into two preprocessing functions (FD+Rand
and FD+RDG) that can satisfy all the four requirements, which
forms our defense solutions.
We conducted extensive experiments to show the effec-
tiveness of our solutions. Our solutions can constrain the
attack success rate under 7% even against 10000 rounds of
BPDA+EOT attack, which significantly outperform 11 state-
of-the-art gradient obfuscation defenses from top-tier confer-
ences.
We expect that our solutions can heat the arms race of
adversarial attacks and defenses, and contribute to the defender
side. We hope the four properties can inspire researchers to
come up with more robust defense strategies. Meanwhile,
we also hope that adaptive attacks against our defenses can
be designed. All these efforts can advance the study and
understanding of adversarial examples and DL model robust-
ness. To better promote this research direction, we release a
toolkit online1, including the implementation of our defense
techniques, a summary of other defense methods as well as
various adversarial attacks.
II. BACKGROUNDS
A. Attack Concept and Scenarios
An adversary can add human-unnoticeable perturbations on
the original input to fool a DNN classifier. Formally, the target
DNN model is a mapping function f(·). Given a clean input
sample x, the corresponding AE is denoted as x˜ = x + δ
where δ is the adversarial perturbation. Then AE generation
can be formulated as the optimization problem in Equation 1a
(targeted attack where l′ 6= f(x) is the desired label set by the
attacker) or Equation 1b (untargeted attack).
min‖δ‖, s.t. f(x˜) = l′ (1a)
min‖δ‖, s.t. f(x˜) 6= f(x) (1b)
Generally, there are two attack scenarios [21], determined
by the adversary’s knowledge about the target system. (1)
White-box scenario: the adversary knows every detail about
the neural network model including the architecture and all
the parameters. He is also aware of the defense mechanism
and the corresponding parameters. (2) Black-box scenario:
the adversary does not have any knowledge about the victim
system. In addition to these two scenarios, there are also some
works [13] assuming the adversary knows all details about the
model but not the defense mechanism. It is not quite realistic
and reasonable to hold the defense secret, as “this widely
held principle is known in the field of security as Kerckhoffs’
principle.” [21]. So we exclude this scenario in this paper.
B. Development History
Round 1: attack. As the first study, Szefedt et al. [1]
adopted the L-BFGS algorithm to solve the optimization
problem of AE generation. Shortly after this work, a couple
of gradient-based methods were introduced to enhance the
attack techniques: the gradient descent evasion attack [22]
1https://github.com/YiZeng623/Advanced-Gradient-Obfuscating
calculated the gradients of neural networks to generate AEs;
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [8] calculated the adver-
sarial perturbation based on the sign of gradients, which was
further improved by its iterative versions (I-FGSM [9] and
MI-FGSM [23]). Deepfool [10] is another iterative method
that outperforms previous attacks by searching for the opti-
mal perturbation across the decision boundary. Meanwhile,
some other techniques were proposed to increase the attack
efficiency: Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [24]
estimated the saliency map of pixels w.r.t the classification
output, and only modified the most salient pixels. One pixel
attack [25] is an extreme-case attack where only one pixel can
be modified to fool the classifier.
Round 2: defense. With the advance of adversarial attacks,
defense solutions were proposed to increase the robustness of
DNN models. They can be classified into three categories.
The first direction is adversarial training [9], [26], [27],
where AEs are used with normal examples together to train
DNN models to recognize and correct malicious samples. The
second direction is to train other models to assist the target
one. Magnet [28] used detector networks to identify AEs by
approximating the manifold of normal examples. Generative
Adversarial Trainer [29] utilized training target networks along
with a generative network to generate adversarial perturbation
for the target model to distinguish. The third direction is
to design AE-aware network architecture or loss function.
Deep Contractive Networks [30] added a contractive penalty to
alleviate the effects of AEs. Input Gradient Regularization [31]
countered AEs by penalizing the degree of variations of
input perturbations on the output. Defensive distillation [32]
generated soft training labels from one network and retrained a
second network with higher robustness. This method claimed
to have very high resistance against AEs and was one of the
strongest defenses at that time.
Round 3: attack. A more powerful attack, C&W [11], was
proposed by updating the objective function to minimize lp
distance between AEs and normal examples. C&W can ef-
fectively defeat Defensive Distillation [11] and other defenses
with assisted models [33] with very high attack success rates.
Round 4: defense. Since then, new defense strategies were
introduced to increase the difficulty of AE generations by
obfuscating the gradients. Five input transformations were
tested to counter AEs in [12], including image cropping
and rescaling, bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, total
variance minimization (TV), and image quilting. Prakash et
al. [13] designed Pixel Deflection (PD), which randomly
redistributes a small number of pixels as artificial perturbation
and applies wavelet-based denoising to remove both artificial
and adversarial perturbation. Xie et al. [14] proposed to use a
randomization layer to randomly rescale the input image with
zero-paddings. Buckman et al. [15] introduced Thermometer
encoding, which encodes input images with discrete values to
prevent the direct calculation of gradient descent during AE
generation. Das et al. [34] proposed SHIELD, a defense that
compresses different regions of an image with random com-
pression levels to mitigate AE perturbations. Those solutions
are effective against all prior attacks.
Round 5: attack. To particularly target the gradient
obfuscation-based defenses, two more advanced attacks were
introduced. BPDA [17] copes with the non-differentiable ob-
fuscation operation by approximating the gradients during
back-propagation. EOT [35] deals with the randomization
obfuscation operation by averaging the gradients of multiple
sessions. More detailed descriptions about BPDA and EOT
can be found in Section IV. After the disclosure of these two
attacks, a large number of defense works have been published.
Unfortunately, most of them did not consider or incorrectly
evaluate these two attacks, and some representative solutions
have been analyzed and proved to be incapable of defeating
BPDA and EOT attacks [19]. Up to now, there are still no
effective preprocessing-based defenses. This is what we aim
to address in this paper.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND THREAT MODEL
It is necessary to specify the adversarial capabilities and
defense requirements in our consideration, as described below.
A. Threat Model
Adversarial Goals. There are two main types of adversarial
attacks: untargeted attacks that try to mislead the DNN models
to an arbitrary label different from the correct one, and targeted
attacks which succeed only when the DNN model predicts the
input as one specific label desired by the adversary [11]. In this
paper, we only evaluate the targeted attacks. The untargeted
attacks can be mitigated in the same way.
Adversary’s Knowledge. We consider a white-box scenario,
where the adversary has full knowledge of the DNN model,
including the network architecture, exact values of parameters,
and hyper-parameters. We further assume that the adver-
sary has full knowledge of the proposed defense, including
the algorithms and parameters. For the defenses employing
randomization techniques, we assume the random numbers
generated in real-time are perfect with a large entropy such
that the adversary cannot obtain or guess the correct values.
It is worth noting that this white-box scenario represents
the strongest adversaries. Under such a scenario, a big number
of existing state-of-the-art defenses are invalidated as shown
in [19]. This also significantly increases the difficulty of
defense designs.
Adversarial Capabilities. The adversary is outside of the
DNN classification system, and he is not able to compromise
the inference computation or the DNN model parameters (e.g.,
via fault injection to cause bit-flips [36] or backdoor attacks
[37]). All he can do is to manipulate the input data with
imperceptible perturbations. In the context of computer vision
tasks, he can directly modify the input image pixel values
within a certain range. We use l∞ and l2 distortion metrics
to measure the scale of added perturbations: we only allow
the generated AEs to have either a maximum l∞ distance of
8/255 or a maximum l2 distance of 0.05 as proposed in [17].
B. Defense Requirements
Based on the above threat model, we list a couple of
requirements for a good defense solution:
First, there should be no modifications to the original DNN
model, e.g., retraining a model with different structures [32]
or datasets [38]. We set this requirement for two reasons. (1)
Model retraining can significantly increase the computation
cost, especially for large-scale DNN models (e.g. ImageNet
scale [39]). (2) Those defense methods lack generality to cover
various types of attacks. They “explicitly set out to be robust
against one specific threat model” [21].
Second, we consider adding a preprocessing function over
the input samples before feeding them into the DNN models.
Such preprocessing operation can either remove the effects of
adversarial perturbations on the inference or make it infeasible
for the adversary to generate AEs adaptively, even he knows
every detail of the operation. This function should be general-
purpose and applicable to various types of data and DNN
models of similar tasks.
Third, this preprocessing function should be lightweight
with negligible computation cost to the inference pipeline. Be-
sides, it should also preserve the usability of the original model
without decreasing its prediction accuracy. Input preprocessing
can introduce a trade-off between security and usability: the
side effect of correcting the adversarial examples can also alter
the prediction results of clean samples. A qualified operation
should balance this trade-off with maximum impact on the
adversarial samples and minimal impact on the clean ones.
IV. METHODOLOGY INSIGHTS AND OVERVIEW
Our proposed solution is based on more advanced gradient
obfuscation techniques. We propose to use a preprocessing
function g(·), which can defeat the advanced attacks within
the threat model in Section III-A and satisfy the requirements
in Section III-B. In this section, we analyze these attacks and
identify the design philosophy of our methodology. We give
specific examples of qualified functions in the next section.
A. Mitigation of Gradient Approximation Attacks
Attack analysis. As mentioned in Section II-B, for shattered
gradient based defense solutions, an non-differentiable oper-
ation g(·) is integrated with the target DNN model f(·) to
preprocess the input samples. Then the model inference pro-
cess becomes y = f(g(x)). This can increase the difficulty of
calculating gradients directly since g(·) is non-differentiable.
Thus AE generation becomes infeasible.
To defeat such defense, BPDA attack was proposed [17].
with a key assumption that the preprocessing function g(·)
maintains the property g(x) ≈ x in order to preserve the
functionality of the target model f(·). This assumption is held
for all existing shattered gradient based solutions. Then the
adversary can use g(·) on the forward pass and replace it with
x on the backward pass when calculating the gradients. The
derivative of the preprocessing function will be approximated
as the derivative of the identity function, which is 1. The
gradient calculation process is described in Eq. 2.
5xf(g(x))|x=xˆ = 5xf(x)|x=g(xˆ) ×5xg(x)|x=xˆ (2a)
≈ 5xf(x)|x=g(xˆ) ×5xx|x=xˆ (2b)
= 5xf(x)|x=g(xˆ) (2c)
Attack mitigation. We identify several necessary properties of
the preprocessing function g(·) in order to mitigate the BPDA
attack. First, this function must preserve the functionality of
the target model, without affecting the prediction results of
normal samples. This gives the first property for our solution:
Property #1: g(·) cannot affect the prediction results:
f(g(x)) = f(x)
.
The BPDA attack depends on the condition that g(x) ≈ x.
To invalidate such an attack, we need to design a preprocessing
function that can break this assumption. This leads to the
second property as below. Note that properties #1 and #2
are not contradictory. It is possible (although challenging)
to identify such preprocessing functions that can satisfy both
properties. We will show detailed examples in Section V-C.
Property #2: g(x) has a large variance from x: g(x) 6≈ x
We should also consider more adaptive attacks. Even the
adversary cannot use x to replace g(x) for gradient calculation
with properties #1 and #2, it is still possible that he might
discover an alternative way to approximate 5xg(x) when
x = xˆ. To eliminate such possibility, we should design a
randomization function g(·) which is the third property:
Property #3: g(·) is a randomization function. A fixed input
xˆ leads to different outputs each time: g(xˆ) 6≈ const.
B. Mitigation of Gradient Expectation Attacks
Attack analysis. Another popular preprocessing operation is
to randomize the gradient of the model in real-time without
affecting the prediction results. To evade such defense strategy,
EOT was adopted as an attack strategy [17], which statistically
computes the gradients over the expected transformation to
the input x. Formally, for a preprocessing function g(·) that
randomly transforms x from a distribution of transformations
T , EOT optimizes the expectation over the transformation with
respect to the input by Et∼T f(g(x)), as shown in Eq. 3. The
adversary can always get a proper expectation with samples
at each gradient descent step.
5x Et∼T f(g(x)) = Et∼T 5x f(g(x)) (3)
Attack mitigation. EOT needs to calculate the gradient of
f(g(x)) in Eq. 3 to calculate the expectation over the trans-
formation. It needs the requirement that g(·) is differentiable.
This gives us the last property for our preprocessing strategy
to mitigate EOT attack:
Property #4: g(·) is non-differentiable.
C. Put Everything Together
In reality, it is difficult to discover a single operation that
can meet all four properties. To simplify this problem, we
can concatenate two operations: g = g1 ◦ g2. Operation g1(·)
focuses on the gradient approximation attack, with properties
#2 and #3. Operation g2(·) focuses on the gradient expectation
attack, with property #4. Both two operations have property
#1. The integration of them can mitigate advanced attacks
(BPDA, EOT, or their combination), as well as classic attacks
(e.g., FGSM, C&W, Deepfool). We present the analysis below.
Mitigating Classic Attacks. Operation g1(·) can lead to
stochastic gradients caused by the randomization factor. Oper-
ation g2(·) can give shattered gradients. As a result, Function
g enjoys both of the two obfuscation features and can defeat
classic attacks as other preprocessing-based solutions.
Mitigating Advanced Attacks. Due to the non-differentiable
g2(·), it is impossible to employ EOT only to compromise
the function g(·). The adversary can ignore the existence of
g2(·) and use EOT to generate perturbations only from f(·)
and g1(·). Such AEs cannot fool the model expected by the
adversary, as the operation g2(·) can invalidate the perturbation
at the inference stage. The adversary has to use a brute force
way to break the g2(·), which has an extremely high cost.
Empirical evaluations will be demonstrated in Section VI.
Due to properties #2 and #3 of g1(·), the BPDA technique
cannot get the correct gradients and optimal perturbation. The
integration of BPDA and EOT techniques can remove the
obstruction from property #3. However, property #2 can still
hinder the adversary from generating effective AEs. We can
see this is the essential property to mitigate advanced attacks,
which existing solutions do not have.
V. EXAMPLES OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS
In this section, we identify some candidate operations that
can satisfy the properties proposed in Section IV.
A. Operation g1(·)
This needs to satisfy the properties of #1, #2, and #3. We
discover one qualified operation from existing work and also
propose a new transformation, which is more efficient.
1) Randomization Layer (Rand): Xie et al. [14] introduced
a randomization layer before the model to preprocess the
image input. Without loss of generality, we consider an image
size of 299×299 (ImageNet). Then the first step is to select a
random number r within the range [299, 330], and rescale the
input image to the size of r×r. Then it adopts a zero-padding
technique to randomly add zeros to the four sides of the image
and pad it to the size of 400 × 400. Before this input is fed
to the target model (e.g., inception v3), it will be reshaped
to 299 × 299 again. With such rescaling-padding-reshaping
steps, certain information or pixels (including adversarial
perturbation) will be dropped with a unified probability.
Based on the evaluations in [14], the introduction of such
a randomization layer has negligible performance degradation
to the target model (property #1). Due to the large randomness
in rescaling and padding, the operation causes a great variance
between the original and preprocessed samples (property #2).
We will quantitatively validate this argument in Section V-C
and Table I. Its gradients cannot be approximated as a constant
(property #3). Thus this is a qualified candidate for g1.
2) Random Distortion over Grids (RDG): We propose a
novel transformation method by adopting the image distortion
method as the preprocessing function g1(·). It can provide a
greater variance between the original and transformed samples
without affecting the model performance.
Our solution originates from the dropping-pixels strategy
[14], [12]. The general idea is to drop certain randomly
selected pixels from the original image, and displace each
pixel away from the original coordinates. The whole procedure
of RDG consists of four stages, as illustrated in Fig.2 and in
Algorithm 1. (1) One of the four corners is randomly selected
as a starting point, e.g. the upper-left corner (line 1). (2) The
original image is a randomly distorted grid by grid. For one
grid, it will be either stretched or compressed based on a
distortion level sampled from a uniform distribution U(−δ, δ)
(line 5-8). (3) Distorted grids are then remapped to construct a
new image (line 10-13). This remapping step will drop certain
pixels: the compressed grids will drop rows or columns of
data; the stretched grids will cause the new image to exceed
the original boundary, thus the pixels being mapped outside
of the original boundary will be dropped (e.g., in Fig.2, the
grid at the lower-right corner in stage 2 is dropped in stage 3).
(4) The distorted image is reshaped to the size of the original
image through cropping or padding (line 14).
Due to the pixel dropping and displacement, RDG can
bring stochastic gradients to satisfy property #3. After the
preprocessing, the transformed input is highly distinct from
the original one (property #2) but still keep the main semantics
for the model to predict (property #1).
B. Operation g2(·)
The design of this operation is relatively easier: it only needs
to meet properties # 1 and #4. Through empirical evaluations,
we identify the optimal operation:
1) Feature Distillation (FD): JPEG compression is a non-
differentiable operation (property #4) that can remove high-
frequency information from the input. This operation has been
demonstrated effective in increasing the model robustness and
removing adversarial perturbations [40], [34], [12] without
degrading the model accuracy (property #1).
We select a compression-based defense, Feature Distillation
(FD) [20], as the operation g2(·). This is an advanced JPEG
compression method, which upgrades the default quantization
table to better adapt to the machine’s visionary behavior. FD
is shown to be more effective towards adversarial attacks
compared to other JPEG based methods [20].
C. Integration of g1(·) and g2(·)
Given the selected operations, we can integrate them to get
the final solutions, which can satisfy all the properties and
mitigate advanced gradient attacks.
Fig. 2: Four stages of the Random Distortion over Grids: (1) Randomly select a corner as the starting point; (2) Randomly generate n grids
vertically and horizontally from the starting point following the variation limits, δ; (3) Distort between each neighboring grids, compress or
stretch, to remap each pixel away from the original coordinates; (4) Acquire the distorted image of the same shape as the input.
ALGORITHM 1: Random Distortion over Grids
Input: original image I ∈ Rh×w
Output: distorted image I ′ ∈ Rh×w
Parameters: distortion limit δ ∈ [0, 1]; size of grid d.
/* 1.Select a starting point, e.g., upper-left corner */
1 x0 = 0, y0 = 0;
/* 2.Random distortion over grids */
2 nw = w//d, nh = h//d;
3 GI = {(xm, yn)|(m,n) ∈ {(0, ..., nw)× (0, ..., nh)}};
4 for (xm, yn) in GI\{(x0, y0)} do
5 δx ∼ U(−δ, δ);
6 δy ∼ U(−δ, δ);
7 xm = xm−1 + d× (1 + δx);
8 yn = yn−1 + d× (1 + δy);
9 end
/* 3.Remapping grids in I to I ′ */
10 GI′ = {(x′m, y′n)|x′m = d×m, y′n = d× n, (m,n) ∈
{(0, ..., nw)× (0, ..., nh)}};
11 for (x′m, y′n) in GI′\{(x′0, y′0)} do
12 I ′(x′m−1 : x
′
m, y
′
n−1 : y
′
n) = Remapping(I(xm−1 :
xm, yn−1 : yn));
13 end
/* 4.Reshape I ′ to the size of I */
14 I ′ = reshape(I ′) s.t. I ′ ∈ Rh×w;
15 return I ′;
• FD+Rand: we first apply the feature distillation operation
over the input. Then we send the compressed image to the
randomization layer for rescaling and padding. After the
transformation, the output can be fed to the DL model.
• FD+RDG: similar to the first solution, the first step is also
feature distillation. Then we use RDG instead of Rand to
further process the input.
Security Analysis. Both of the two end-to-end solutions use
the FD operation, which is non-differentiable. Then the inte-
grated functions are also non-differentiable, satisfying property
#4. The Rand and RDG operations randomize the pixels,
making the solutions meet property #3.
We measure the model accuracy to verify the property #1 of
the two solutions. For property #2, we measure the l2 norm and
Structural Similarity (SSIM) score [41] between the original
and transformed images. A larger l2 norm or a smaller SSIM
score indicates that the preprocessing function can bring a
larger amount of changes to the image. Table I reports the
results and comparisons with other techniques. We can observe
all those methods can maintain high accuracy for the model.
RDG, Rand and their integration with FD can outperform other
solutions with larger l2 norm and smaller SSIM values. This
validates that the selected operations and integrated solutions
have expected properties for attack mitigation.
TABLE I: Comparisons of different solutions for model accuracy and
amount of changes.
Name of the Defense l2 norm SSIM Acc
FD [20] + RDG 0.1944 0.3093 0.95
FD [20] + Rand [14] 0.2411 0.2820 0.94
RDG 0.1903 0.3116 0.96
Rand [14] 0.2268 0.3110 0.96
FD [20] 0.1343 0.4310 0.97
SHIELD [34] 0.0405 0.8475 0.94
TV [12] 0.0338 0.8759 0.95
Bit-depth Reduction [42] 0.0709 0.7730 0.92
PD [13] 0.0147 0.9877 0.97
VI. EVALUATION
We conduct a very comprehensive evaluation of our pro-
posed techniques. We consider various attacks: advanced gra-
dient approximation and expectation attacks (BPDA, EOT, and
their integration), as well as standard ones (I-FGSM, LBFGS,
and C&W). We compare our methods with 8 state-of-the-
art solutions published in top-tier conferences over the past
2 years under the same setting. For the comparison, we re-
implement 7 state-of-the-art solutions published in top-tier
conferences recently under the same setting to show the re-
sults. Also, we give a broader comparison by including another
4 state-of-the-art solutions published in top-tier conferences
recently but with more relax defense requirements.
(a) ACC per round under BPDA attack. (b) ASR per round under BPDA attack.
(c) ACC per round under BPDA+EOT attack. (d) ASR per round under BPDA+EOT attack.
(e) ACC per round under Semi-Brute-Force Attack based on EOT. (f) ASR per round under Semi-Brute-Force Attack based on EOT.
Fig. 3: Model accuracy and attack success rate of various techniques under different attacks.
A. Implementation
Configurations. We adopt Tensorflow as the deep learning
framework to implement the attacks and defenses. The learn-
ing rate of the BPDA attack is set to 0.1, and the ensemble
size of the EOT procedure is set to 302. All the experiments
were conducted on a server equipped with 8 Intel I7-7700k
CPUs and 4 NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
Target Model and Dataset. Our methods are general-purpose
and can be applied to various models as a preprocessing step
for computer vision tasks. Without the loss of generality,
we choose a pre-trained Inception V3 model [43] over the
ImageNet dataset as the target model of attacks and defenses.
This state-of-the-art model can reach 78.0% top-1 and 93.9%
top-5 accuracy. We randomly select 100 images from the
ImageNet Validation dataset for AE generation. These images
can be predicted correctly by this Inception V3 model.
Metrics. The pixel values are normalized to [0, 1]. We use the
l2 norm to measure the number of perturbations generated by
each attack, which is calculated by computing the total root-
mean-square distortion normalized by the number of pixels
(299× 299× 3). We only accept adversarial examples with a
l2 norm smaller than 0.05. We consider the targeted attacks
where each target label different from the correct one is
randomly generated [17]. The BPDA and EOT attacks are
iterative processes: we stop the attack when an example is
generated which is predicted as its corresponding target label
and the l2 normal is smaller than 0.05. For each attack round,
we measure the prediction accuracy of the generated AEs
(ACC) and the attack success rate (ASR) of the targeted attack
A higher accuracy or lower attack success rate indicates the
defense is more resilient against the attacks.
B. Mitigating BPDA Attack
We first evaluate the effectiveness of our two solutions
against the BPDA attack. For comparison, we re-implemented
6 existing solutions including FD [20], SHIELD [34], TV [12],
JPEG [12], Bit-depth Reduction [42], and PD [13]. We select
these methods because they are all preprocessing-only defense,
fitting our defense requirements in Section III-B. Other defense
solutions need to alter the target model. We give a comparison
with them in Section VI-F. The model prediction accuracy and
attack success rate in each round are shown in Fig. 3(a) and
3(b), respectively.
We can observe that after 50 attack rounds, all the prior
solutions except FD can only keep the model accuracy lower
than 5%, and attack success rates reach higher than 90%.
Those defenses fail to mitigate the BPDA attack. FD can keep
the attack success rate lower than 20% and the model accuracy
is around 40%. This is better but still not very effective in
maintaining the model’s robustness.
In contrast, three solutions are particularly effective against
BPDA attack: FD+Rand, FD+RDG, and Rand. Those tech-
niques can maintain an acceptable model accuracy (around
2We tested different ensemble size chosen from 2 to 40. Different ensemble
size has little influence on ASR or ACC but larger ensemble size can generate
AEs with less l2.
70% for 50 perturbation rounds), and restrict the attack success
rate to around 0. These results are consistent with the l2 norm
and SSIM metrics in TABLE I: the randomization effects in
those operations cause large variances between g(x) and x,
thus invalidating the BPDA attack assumption. Moreover, if
we use the RDG alone as the defense method, the results of the
ACC and ASR will be very similar to the one of FD+RDG (so
using RDG alone as a defense is not presented in the Fig. 3(a)
and 3(b)). However, we do notice that Rand alone can be
attacked by EOT as shown in [17] and we found that RDG faces
the same situation. More evaluation of mitigating BPDA+EOT
attacks are shown in Section VI-C.
We continue the attack until the samples with adversarial
perturbations reach the l2 bound (0.05). For FD+RDG, the
adversary needs 231 rounds to reduce the model accuracy to
57% and achieve an attack success rate of 2%. For FD+Rand,
the adversary needs 188 rounds to reduce the model accuracy
to 63% and achieve an attack success rate of 3%. Therefore,
we conclude that our proposed techniques can effectively
mitigate the BPDA attack.
C. Mitigating BPDA+EOT Attack
Next, we consider a form of more powerful attack which
combines BPDA and EOT [17], [19]. This attack can beat
the defenses with both the shatter gradients and stochastic
gradients. For experimentation, we only consider methods that
can mitigate the BPDA attack. This gives us two baseline
solutions: Rand and Random Crop3 [12]. Fig. 3(c) and 3(d)
report model accuracy (ACC) and attack success rate (ASR)
under BPDA+EOT attack.
We can observe both Rand and Random Crop fail to
mitigate this strong attack: the model accuracy drops to below
20% after 20 rounds, and the attack success rate reaches
100% after 50 rounds. In contrast, our proposed techniques can
still hold an accuracy of higher than 50% and attack success
rate of smaller than 10% after 50 attack rounds. FD+RDG is
slightly better than FD+Rand. The essential component that
makes our solutions outperform others is the non-differentiable
transformation FD function, which can conceal its gradients
and remove the adversarial perturbation more effectively.
We perform more rounds of attacks until the samples with
adversarial perturbations reach the l2 bound (0.05). FD+RDG
can maintain a model accuracy of 58% and reduce the attack
success rate to 7%, while FD+Rand can maintain an accuracy
of 54% and keep the attack success rate as 9%.
D. Mitigating Semi-Brute-Force Attacks based on EOT
Although the adversary cannot use EOT to attack the entire
preprocessing function g, it is possible that he can generate
AEs only based on the differentiable component. In our case,
the adversary can ignore the existence of g2 and perform EOT
on the operation g1 only. With the generated AE, the adversary
can test if it can defeat g2 as well. He can repeat the above
procedure until a proper AE is found that can fool both g1 and
3We did not report Random Crop in Section VI-B as it causes a big drop
to the model accuracy (30%-40%).
g2. Figs 3(e) and 3(f) show the ACC and ASR of this semi-
brute-force attack. We can observe that after 50 rounds, the
ACC of FD+RDG is 40% and the ASR is 40%. For FD+Rand,
the ACC is 20% and ASR is 70%. After 10,000 rounds (which
takes 19 hours 54 minutes), the ACC of FD+Rand stays at
8% and the ASR is 89%. The ACC of FD+RDG stays at 8%
and the ASR is 90%.
Although this attack can break our solutions, it is not very
practical. First, the cost of generating adversarial examples is
too high. Second, the technique is not sophistical and optimal.
EOT is used to target the randomization operation g1 only.
However, for the operation g2 (a non-differentiable function
FD used in this paper), the adversary has to use a brute-force
fashion to handle: trying different AEs generated from EOT
targeting only g1 until finding AEs that can fool g1 + g2. Its
attack success rate is relying only on the robustness level of
g2: it is possible to design a stronger g2 to further increase
the attack cost or even totally mitigate it. For instance, in our
design, if we can follow [20] to add one extra FD operation to
make g as FD×2+RDG, then the ACC after 50 rounds becomes
around 55% and the ASR is 17%. We can further increase the
robustness of g2 with FD×3 operations, as shown in Figs 3(e)
and 3(f), and TABLE II.
TABLE II: Semi-brute-force attacks against different defenses.
Operations
Attak rounds required to target ASR
10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
FD+RDG 14 38 59 207 7424
FD×2+RDG 31 83 538 10000+ 10000+
FD×3+RDG 57 216 10000+ 10000+ 10000+
E. Mitigating Standard Attacks
In addition to the advanced attacks, we also test our defenses
against standard attacks, i.e., I-FGSM, LBFGS, and C&W.
For I-FGSM, AEs are generated under l∞ constraint of 0.03.
For LBFGS and C&W, the attack process is iterated under
l2 constraint and stops when all targeted AEs are found. We
measure the model accuracy (ACC) and attack success rate
(ASR) with the protection of FD+Rand and FD+RDG.
The results are shown in TABLE III. For benign samples
only, our proposed techniques have little influence on the
model accuracy (92% and 95% for FD+Rand and FD+RDG,
respectively). For defeating AEs generated by these standard
attacks, the attack success rate can be kept as 0% and the
model accuracy can be maintained as around 90%. We provide
more experimental details with different attack settings and
defense configurations in Appendix A.
TABLE III: Performance of our defenses against I-FGSM, LBFGS,
and C&W.
Attack l2
No Defense FD+Rand FD+RDG
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
No attack 0.0 100% Nan 92% Nan 95% Nan
I-FGSM 0.010 2% 95% 88% 0% 93% 0%
LBFGS 0.001 0% 100% 92% 0% 91% 0%
C&W 0.016 0% 100% 86% 0% 87% 0%
F. A Broader Comparison with More Defenses
In addition to the eight existing preprocessing solutions, we
also compare our defenses with a broader set of defenses
against bounded adaptive attacks. These methods are also
based on preprocessing, and some of them are also combined
with model retraining (ME-Net) or adversarial training (Crop,
JPEG, TV, Quilting, ME-Net). These methods were proven to
be broken partially or entirely by advanced attacks (BPDA or
BPDA+EOT).
We summarize the analytic results, experimental data as
well as conclusions from literature, as shown in TABLE IV.
The perturbation criteria is chosen either under l∞ bound
(0.031) or l2 bound (0.05) to generate imperceptible AEs. We
list the model accuracy when the samples with adversarial
perturbations are under the bound. We can observe that our
defense shows more resistance against advanced attacks and
keeps the model accuracy as high as 58% under the l2 bound.
We use the four properties (Section IV) to reveal the reason
that our solution can beat others. As shown in TABLE IV,
all the prior defenses satisfy only part of the properties.
In this case, even combined with adversarial training, most
defenses cannot provide enough robustness. Note that ME-
Net has the best performance among these past defenses,
as it meets properties #2 #3 #4. However, it uses model
retraining to achieve higher accuracy on clean samples, which
violates the property #1. This results in changes in model
parameters, which could potentially provide more information
to the adversary under the white-box setting.
From these results, we conclude that the four properties
are indeed helpful to increase the difficulty of adversarial
attacks. We also think there might probably be other potential
properties that are useful to further improve the defenses.
We encourage researchers to consider these properties when
designing a preprocessing-based defense and also to find more
useful properties.
VII. FUTURE WORK
We hope that our findings in this paper can inspire both the
adversary and defender to understand the adversarial examples
and enhance their techniques to continue the arms races. We
identify some possible future research directions.
Defense. As we demonstrated in Section VI-D, an semi-brute-
force attack can break FD+RDG, although the attack cost is
high. To thwart this attack, we add more FD operations into the
preprocessing function, as suggested by [20]. In the future, we
aim to design more lightweight non-differentiable operations
that are infeasible to be fooled by AEs from the EOT attack.
Our preprocessing function consists of several operations in
order to satisfy all the properties in Section IV. So an adaptive
attack can ignore certain operations, and only target the rest
ones to generate AEs. In the future, we aim to design a single
preprocessing function with the four properties. So the attacker
cannot break it into different parts and attack it adaptively.
Attack. It is also interesting to enhance the attacks from the
adversarial perspective. The first direction is to optimize the
EOT attack and reduce the cost. Currently, it simply generates
TABLE IV: Comparisons with a broader set of defenses against bounded adaptive attacks. (* denotes adversarial training).
Defense Attack #Property 1 #Property 2 #Property 3 #Property 4 l∞ bounded (0.031) l2 bounded (0.05)
Rand [14] BPDA+EOT • • • 0% -
PixelDefend [44] BPDA • • 9% -
Crop* [12] BPDA+EOT • • - 0%
JPEG* [12] BPDA • • - 0%
TV* [12] BPDA+EOT • • • - 0%
Quilting* [12] BPDA+EOT • • • - 0%
SHIELD* [34] BPDA • • - 0%
Pixel Deflection [13] BPDA • • • 0% -
Guided Denoiser [45] BPDA • • - 0%
ME-Net* [46] BPDA+EOT • • • 13% -
FD [20] BPDA • • • - 10%
FD+RDG (Ours) BPDA+EOT • • • • - 58%
AEs from the randomization operation and tests if it can fool
the non-differentiable operation. It is necessary to consider
the non-differentiable operation as well and generate AEs
targeting it with fewer rounds. The Brute-force fashion EOT
attack is not a promising research direction.
The second direction is to consider the preprocessing func-
tion with more than two operations or a single operation, as
described above. For three or more operations, how can the
adversary classify them into attacking group and ignored group
needs to be explored. For one operation, a new attack strategy
to deal with all four properties is necessary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose new solutions to mitigate the
advanced gradient-based adversarial attacks (BPDA and EOT).
Specifically, we first identify four properties to reveal the
possible defense opportunities. Following these properties, we
design two preprocessing solutions to invalidate these attacks.
We evaluate our methodologies over existing attack techniques
and compare with 11 state-of-the-art defense approaches.
Empirical results indicate that these two proposed methods
have the best performance in mitigating the powerful attacks.
We expect the properties and solutions proposed in this
paper can inspire more advanced attack and defense techniques
in the future. All the efforts can enhance people’s understand-
ing about the attack and defense mechanisms, as well as the
robustness of DL models.
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APPENDIX
We evaluate the robustness of our defenses against standard
attacks, FGSM, I-FGSM, LBFGS, C&W. All attacks are
conducted as targeted attack, we randomly select classes that
are different from original ones. An attack succeeds only
if the prediction of model becomes the targeted class. We
use Cleverhans package [47] to generate AE of all standard
attacks. For FGSM and I-FGSM, AEs are generated under two
different l∞ constraints ( = 0.01, 0.03). I-FGSM is iteratied
10 times. For LBFGS and C&W, the optimization process is
iterated until all targeted AEs are found under l2 constraint.
For LBFGS, the binary search steps are set to 5 and the
maximum number of iterations is set to 1000. For CW, the
binary search steps are set to 5, the maximum number of
iterations is set to 1000, and the learning rate is 0.1. We
evaluate the model accuracy (ACC) and attack success rate
(ASR), as well as the l∞ norm and l2 norm, TABLE VIII.
Note that FGSM is just a one-step attack and it is not really
effective as a targeted attack. Its iterative version I-FGSM with
 = 0.03 can reach ASR 95%. Two optimization-based attacks,
LBFGS and CW, can even entirely break the baseline model
with 100% ASR.
For the operations proposed in Section V, there are several
hyper-parameters to be determined.
For FD+Rand, the padding size p and padding value pvalue
have influence on the image randomization level. We first vary
the padding size from 300 to 500, as shown in TABLE V. The
optimal padding size is 400. Then we test the padding value
for 0, 0.5 and 1, as shown in TABLE IX.
For FD+RDG, the distortion limit δ has influence on distor-
tion level of each grids. It also affects the ratio of pixels that
will be dropped. We apply a linear search of δ from 0.01 to
0.30, as show in TABLE VI. The ASR becomes 0% under
our defenses, which shows that the adversarial perturbation is
delicate to this kind of distortion. A larger δ decreases the
ACC on clean examples. Thus, a moderate δ = 0.15 is chosen
as the optimal value.
Finally, with chosen hyper-parameters, we test the perfor-
mance of different defenses against standard attacks, FD, RDG,
FD+RDG, FD+Rand, in TABLE VII.
TABLE V: Impact of padding size on defense performance of FD+Rand
Attack
p = 300 p = 350 p = 400 p = 450 p = 500
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
Clean 0.95 Nan 0.92 Nan 0.92 Nan 0.91 Nan 0.89 Nan
FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.62 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.72 0.00
FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.50 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.60 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.90 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.87 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.85 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.86 0.00
LBFGS 0.94 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.85 0.00
CW 0.88 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.88 0.00
TABLE VI: Impact of distortion limits on defense performance of FD+RDG
Attack
δ = 0.01 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.10 δ = 0.15 δ = 0.20 δ = 0.25 δ = 0.30
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
Clean 0.95 Nan 0.96 Nan 0.95 Nan 0.95 Nan 0.96 Nan 0.93 Nan 0.91 Nan
FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.70 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.72 0.00
FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.62 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.96 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.93 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.88 0.01 0.90 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.89 0.00
LBFGS 0.95 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.88 0.00
C&W 0.86 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.84 0.00
TABLE VII: Performance of different defenses against standard attacks
Attack
Baseline FD RDG Rand FD+RDG FD+Rand
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
Clean 1.00 Nan 0.97 Nan 0.96 Nan 0.96 Nan 0.95 Nan 0.92 Nan
FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.36 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.79 0.00
FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.39 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.58 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.13 0.79 0.96 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.91 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.02 0.95 0.87 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.86 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.88 0.00
LBFGS 0.00 1.00 0.97 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.92 0.00
CW 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.86 0.00
TABLE VIII: Standard attacks on baseline model.
Attack l∞ l2
Baseline
ACC ASR
Clean 0.000 0.0000 1.00 Nan
FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.010 0.0099 0.36 0.00
FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.030 0.0294 0.39 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.010 0.0040 0.13 0.79
I-FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.030 0.0098 0.02 0.95
LBFGS 0.021 0.0013 0.00 1.00
CW 0.156 0.0162 0.00 1.00
TABLE IX: Impact of padding value on defense performance of
FD+Rand
Attack
pvalue = 0 pvalue = 0.5 pvalue = 1
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
Clean 0.91 Nan 0.92 Nan 0.93 Nan
FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.73 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.75 0.00
FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.55 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.60 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.01) 0.89 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.91 0.00
I-FGSM ( = 0.03) 0.87 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.83 0.00
LBFGS 0.91 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.87 0.00
CW 0.88 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.91 0.00
